The South China Sea (SCS) regularly remains in High Tide status, thanks to its strategic and economic importance. An estimated $3.37 trillion in global trade, one-third of global maritime trade, 80 per cent of China’s energy imports, and 40 per cent of its total trade passes through it. Being an economic lifeline to other smaller (as compared to China) archipelagic countries spread like a necklace around it, with whom China remains at maritime loggerheads due to its hegemonic approach, South China Sea becomes turbulent every now and then. The Strait of Malacca, connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans through SCS, makes it globally strategically important.
The three major stakeholders responsible for maintaining the stability in SCS are China, ASEAN members and the UN, through its Charter on Laws of Sea (UNCLOS). Let us analyze each of them, looking at their intentions and abilities to resolve the conflict in SCS.
Bullish China
Ever since the change of guard in 1949 after a bitter civil war, the communist regime has relentlessly pursued an expansionist policy, both for its land as well as maritime boundaries.
The end of the Maoist regime in in 1978 ushered an era of economic revival, from a socialist to a mixed economy that included the development of coastal cities as SEZ (Special Economic Zone), thereby enhancing its interest in the SCS. A major inherent drawback due to its geographical location of not being open to any ocean despite having a coastline of 18,000 km, makes the domination of SCS extremely important for China. Hence, its hegemony in the region is likely to continue.
Helpless ASEAN
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN, a ten-member group, was formed in July 1967 by five founder members—Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The basic aim of the grouping then was to contain the influence of communism. However, post-Vietnam war, the priority shifted towards acceleration of economic growth in the region—a period which unfortunately coincided with similar changes in China. The control of islands in the SCS became more important than before for the expansion of EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). China claimed almost the entire SCS through the nine-dash line. This resulted in a major dispute over the Spratly Islands with the Philippines and Vietnam, with Indonesia over Natuna gas fields, and later with Brunei when it became the sixth member of ASEAN over Louisa Reef.
In 1995, Vietnam became the seventh member of ASEAN. The arrival of Vietnam in ASEAN resulted in China contemplating the possibility of its disputes in SCS with individual countries taking the shape of ASEAN vs China, a situation the economically growing China could not afford. If ASEAN, as a group, could project its maritime space as one single entity while dealing with China, Beijing would have been a major loser. Hence such a move had to be somehow thwarted.
If some countries of the Southeast Asia region enjoying good bilateral relations with China could get integrated into ASEAN, getting a consensus as a group against China would become much more difficult. The entry of the last three members of ASEAN—Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia—between 1997 to 99 possibly fits into that design. China has good bilateral trade relations with all of them and they enjoy China's economic patronage. Thus, ASEAN, a group having a combined population of 600 million covering a total area of 4.5 million Km2, having a combined GDP to the tune of $10.2 trillion, accounting for nearly 7 per cent of the global trade, has been made redundant and helpless against the Bullish China in the SCS.
Clawless UNCLOS
The United Nations Charter on Laws of Sea (UNCLOS) is an international agreement providing a legal framework for all maritime activities. It basically replaced the age-old and outdated 17th century ‘Freedom of Seas’ concept which restricted the national territories to a cannon shot distance of 3 nautical miles (nm).
The UNCLOS III was finalised in 1982 after nine years of deliberations. The national maritime boundaries and EEZ are well-defined in the new charter. Since China and ASEAN members had ratified the charter, it was presumed that their maritime disputes in SCS would be resolved through this new tool. However, things went from bad to worse.
In her article 'The Role of ASEAN in the South China Sea Disputes' Letiica Simoes, the famous international affairs academician claims that UNCLOS III of 1982 gave a new boost to the competing claims in the SCS region.
The countries started expanding their coastal territories and venturing into new alternatives like the creation of artificial islands.
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In addition, China signed the Declaration of Conduct of Parties ( DOC) with ASEAN for the SCS. The DOC does not have a dispute resolution mechanism and is non-binding. The disagreements are resolved by signatories on a voluntary basis. Thus, it is nothing but a tool of convenience that China managed to create in connivance with some ASEAN members to circumvent and bypass the more stringent UNCLOS.
Courtesy to DOC, China blatantly defies not only the UNCLOS provisions but also the judgements of the International Court of Justice.
Thus the sordid saga of the SCS continues. It has, however, the potential to turn into a catastrophe. Taiwan remains an unfinished agenda for China. Hong Kong will get fully integrated in 2047 when the ongoing 50-year transitionary period expires. The sovereignty of China over Hong Kong and Taiwan takes care of its stated Strait of Malacca Dilemma.
Hence, The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue)―comprising the United States, Australia, India and Japan—which has been formed to checkmate China’s hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region cannot remain merely a mute spectator. I had already highlighted in one of my earlier articles, the need to expand the QUAD spectrum by including countries like Indonesia. Possibly Quad and ASEAN (especially those having disputes with China in SCS) coming together should be the right strategic option. India individually and as a member of Quad must take necessary proactive measures to safeguard its long-term strategic interests.
The author, a strategic affairs expert, serves as an officer on special duty to the lieutenant governor of Delhi.
