Cool in attitude, calm in demeanour, amiable in disposition—that’s how Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar would be described by most who have observed them closely over the years. These are endearing qualities that should hold them in good stead in the NDA 3.0 government as the duo face challenges much beyond the mundane and the obvious, amid a rapidly changing political and strategic environment that has changed the world much more from how it was during Modi 1.0 of 2014 or the Modi 2.0 government of 2019.
Defying the sense of a proportionate response, Israel has responded to a sudden and brutal attack by Hamas militants on Israeli settlements on October 7, 2023 by using almost its entire military assault might. Thousands of civilians including women and children have died in Israel’s bombardments. But what it has unleashed is an unprecedented instability in the region that is now finding echoes in the form of protests worldwide.
While the Russia-Ukraine conflict began on a smaller scale in 2014, an all-out foray by Russian soldiers into Ukraine began on February 24, 2022. Since then, with the US-led NATO firmly behind Ukraine, Russia has been taking on the combined military might of the West. No wonder, the war is far from producing a decisive result.
Much closer home, the Myanmar civil war was sparked off by a coup on February 1, 2021. Since then, the pro-democracy forces and the numerous Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), and ragtag bands of guerrilla fighters in Myanmar have joined hands to militarily take on Naypyitaw. What has resulted is a seesaw battle that has witnessed thousands of non-combatant deaths and massive displacements.
These three developments have unleashed forces that have considerably altered the geostrategic environment and circumstances. In all these three situations, India, led from the front by former career diplomat Jaishankar, had handled the strategic balance with commendable diplomatic finesse and aplomb. It may not be possible during NDA 3.0.
Old friend Russia, the US-led West with which India has considerably warmed up to, close friend Israel and the Palestinians may seek a more decisive and clear articulation of its position by India.
Gopalaswami Parthasarathy, strategist and a former Indian ambassador to Pakistan, told THE WEEK: “There is one thing about Indian diplomacy and strategy—its flexibility. It has the ability to adjust itself to change. It has changed itself from a socialist economy to a free market economy. As long as we have our domestic priorities right and keep our house in order, we will do well. After all, foreign policy has to change with circumstances. Of course, China will be the most serious challenge. Pakistan is a failing state and Myanmar is in a mess and in war with itself.”
As an indication of things to come, India may well have articulated its position on Myanmar by not inviting the military junta-led Myanmar to the swearing-in ceremony of the new ministers at the Rashtrapati Bhavan on June 9.
“India has always been for a democratic disposition where the will of the people matters. It may also be on a case-to-case basis where they may not be invited for events like this but for matters of strategic importance, we may interact with them,” says General Manoj Mukund Naravane, former Indian Army chief who had served as India’s defence attaché in Myanmar.
From the military point of view, India’s space to manoeuvre may be considerably constrained with both Russia and the US asking tough questions. Take procurements for instance. The US has questioned India opting for the Russian S-400 missile defence system while Russia has questioned India’s overture to buy US attack drones.
Or the Chabahar port pact that India has recently inked with Iran. Having earlier exempted the port from US sanctions, there may be a reversal in the American stand. India has already indicated it is in no mood to relent to US pressures. “But then, no country can tell India what to do, what not to do and then dictate terms,” adds Gen Naravane.
Traditionally, India has relied substantially on Israel for a range of military equipment like cyber security systems and drones. But with Israel deeply embroiled in a conflict with the Hamas and other pro-Iranian proxy outfits, and with signs that a Centre-Left government may emerge in Israel, there may be restrictions on Israeli military equipment for India.
The defence and the foreign affairs ministries would also be concerned that military exports from India have not increased substantially and nor have imports from foreign shores gone down underlining a lack of thrust of the ‘Make in India’ policy.
With the Modi 1.0 and the Modi 2.0 governments enjoying an effective majority in Parliament, New Delhi was able to take quite a few ‘spur of the moment’ decisions as there were not too many legislative checks and balances. NDA 3.0 will be a different proposition, more so in the case of big-ticket military buys. This will impact India’s foreign policy environment too.
Internationally, there has been an appreciable crack in the NATO alliance with many European nations seeking a European Union that is relatively independent of US hegemony, underlining the fact that Europe is changing, which is being accentuated by the fact that there has been a serious rise of Right wing forces in several nations.
Why it matters in the Indian foreign policy context is that India has for quite some time, as a matter of conscious policy, had dealt with different countries in silos. These were relationships that were somewhat immune to its ties with other nations—a distinct relationship with Russia, another with the US, or with France and with Israel and Germany. With the emergence of a divided world that comprises ‘blocs’, this aspect of Indian foreign policy would be impacted.
India will also have to take a closer look at West Asia where there has been considerable changes.
West Asia has always been of critical importance to India because of three chief factors. One, West Asia has been a source of fuel for an energy-deficient India; Two, if India has to manage its Kashmir policy, a sphere of influence in Muslim-dominated West Asia is of paramount importance; Three, West Asia is a region where the Chinese influence has been growing by leaps and bounds. So it is becoming a region where India is not a decisive player, but China is. India’s West Asia policy will therefore have to be suitably fine-tuned.
But most importantly, India’s defence and foreign policies of recent times have been based on an ‘aggressive’ personality cult of Narendra Modi. But with a mandate where the BJP doesn’t have a majority, how far that approach will work during NDA 3.0 is a question to ponder upon.
On the way forward, R. Dayakar, former Indian ambassador to Iraq and Jordan, told THE WEEK: “Enlightened self-interest of the country will continue to guide and shape the foreign policy of NDA 3.0. Neighbours First, Act East, Look West approaches and continental and maritime security interests will continue to define the style and substance of India's foreign policy outlook. Also, domestic and foreign policies are not necessarily mirror images of each other of NDA, as before.”