In East Asia, most strategic scholars tend to view India's foreign policy as balanced diplomacy. This is especially evident as the first country Prime Minister Modi visited and embraced during his third term was Russia, meeting with President Putin. Many interpret Modi's move as a setback to the US Indo-Pacific strategy.
Indeed, the US Indo-Pacific strategy often seems more bark than bite, with action typically being taken only after the “created” problems have already swept in. It's rare to see the United States, a century-old maritime power, adopting someone else's strategic security concept. "Indo-Pacific" was originally a term proposed by the Indian Navy, but it only became part of America's national strategy after Shinzo Abe gave it a strategic framework.
If the US Indo-Pacific strategy is meant to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative, it's unclear what benefits or shared interests it offers. While the US stresses freedom of navigation under international law, its allies are left to pick up the tab and react repeatedly. It matters to the US, but India has its own priorities.
The Ukraine war has had varying impacts on the world over different periods. When PM Narendra Modi addressed the US Congress, he stated, "This is not an era of war. The war in Ukraine involves major powers and the consequences are severe." During India's G20 presidency, Modi emphasised India's readiness to contribute in any way to restore peace.
This reality underscores India's delicate role in global conflicts. Ironically, while President Biden promotes the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad, it is Russia—labelled as an "axis of evil"—that has supplied India with fuel during the global energy crisis. This support has kept India's manufacturing sector running, sustaining the democratic supply chain.
If Western countries are serious about their Indo-Pacific strategy and making India a key manufacturing hub, they must ensure a stable supply of energy, raw materials, capital, and technology, rather than fueling a prolonged war.
Reflecting back to June 17, while Joe Biden was still campaigning for re-election, NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg visited Washington and issued a stern warning: "China should pay for propping up Russia's Ukraine war." He also urged NATO to supply more weapons to Ukraine and asserted that Ukraine's path to NATO membership is "irreversible." Recently, the first batch of F-16 jets manufactured by Lockheed Martin arrived in Ukraine, marking the delivery of the latest advanced weaponry to the conflict zone.
As Biden announced he would not seek re-election, Kamala Harris stepped in as the presidential candidate, with little mention of the Ukraine war in her campaign. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba visited China and indicated Kyiv's willingness to engage in talks with Russia if Moscow showed genuine intent, stating, "The main topic of discussion will be the search for ways to stop Russia's aggression and China's possible role in achieving a stable and just peace."
If it is indeed time for peace to prevail, no one is inclined to credit the Chinese Communist Party for this breakthrough. However, the only viable mediator acceptable to Putin is India, given the unyielding stance of other European nations. This positions Modi as the most strategic candidate for the role, especially as India has consistently voted against or abstained from United Nations resolutions imposing sanctions on Russia.
Modi's willingness to act as a mediator stems from several strategic considerations. With NATO's increasing involvement, an escalation of the Ukraine war could force India to take sides, a scenario it seeks to avoid despite its preference for neutrality. Achieving "semiconductor independence" is a crucial goal for India. If the conflict intensifies, India's alignment with the West could facilitate partnerships with the leading semiconductor powers, a prospect that Russia views with significant disfavour.
Additionally, China would not tolerate Russia being encircled by NATO, as Russia's collapse would likely shift the focus of sanctions to China. With NATO's support, the Ukraine conflict is edging towards a scenario reminiscent of a potential Third World War, which contradicts India's ambition to become the world's third-largest economy within five years. Therefore, Modi needs to take proactive measures by first visiting Putin and then Kyiv to mediate and prevent further escalation, lest India become a passive actor in this unfolding crisis.
From India's national interest perspective, mediating to de-escalate the Ukraine conflict is crucial for providing the stability needed for global investors to confidently establish semiconductor supply chains. Only through reducing tensions and halting NATO's expansion of the war can India develop its semiconductor infrastructure and become the world's third-largest economy. As long as the war's duration remains uncertain, investors will hesitate to commit to India's semiconductor ambitions.
Despite China supplying Russia with dual-use technology and boosting bilateral trade to over $240 billion, Russia's grand Siberian development plan notably excludes India. Nonetheless, India's primary goal is to develop its semiconductor supply chain rather than engage in warfare; therefore, it has exercised restraint in the border tensions.
In the broader context of Modi's diplomatic manoeuvres amidst the Ukraine war and the recent US election developments, a clear pattern emerges. Modi's strategic visit to Putin shortly after taking office, followed by Biden's announcement not to seek re-election and Harris stepping in as the candidate, allows the Democratic Party to distance itself from the Ukraine issue without much explanation. This sets the stage for Modi to visit Ukraine and take further mediation steps.
From Russia's perspective, Putin understands that India needs the conflict to de-escalate to accelerate its semiconductor supply chain development and achieve its goal of becoming one of the top five semiconductor powers within five years. This also presents an ideal opportunity for Taiwan to transfer its semiconductor supply chain to India. Despite China's disapproval, Russia would support India in this endeavour.
This narrative resembles a reciprocal arrangement: India helps Russia mediate in the Ukraine conflict, while Russia supports India by using the Siberian development plan to placate China, facilitating India's advancement in high-tech development. Implicit in this strategy is the notion that, if Modi is given the time to achieve these economic goals, India might eventually align more closely with shared interests. As Putin might subtly reassure Xi, "Let's give Modi the time he needs; once India reaches its economic goals, its alignment with our interests will naturally follow."
Prof. Lin, Hsiao-Chen is an Assistant Professor, Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies (GIIASS) at Tamkang University & Member of Taiwan’s 2024 Ministry of National Defense QDR Advisory Committee
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK