It is truism to say that the current situation in Bangladesh will have a disproportionate impact on India’s northeast (NE) as compared to the rest of country, not just from a security perspective but also a socio-political and economic standpoint. Thus, it is pertinent that the debate on the situation, its genesis and possible response, achieves centrality in the discourse of NE.
Let’s begin with the various narratives on how organic were the mass protests that toppled the Sheikh Hasina government. We will skip some of the rather outlandish theories floating around for the sake of keeping this discussion within the realm of practicality. To begin with, let’s address the proverbial elephant in the room; was this a right-wing Islamist protest cloaked as a students’ protest? Like all things in realpolitik, there are no binary answers. Empirical evidences and discussions with people in the know in Bangladesh leaves little doubt that this was, in fact, a students’ protest triggered by a High Court order which set aside the government’s decision to abolish the 30 per cent reservation for freedom fighters of the Liberation War.
However, it is equally true that opposition parties and their allies, read as Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh (JeI), did join the protest especially in its second phase where, some may argue, they took a lead role, as evidenced by the violence perpetrated by the protesters, which was absent in the first phase. A question that bears inquiry, is it not natural for any political party to rally behind expressions of grievances against the ruling dispensation by a social segment, no matter the temporal or spatial context? In fact, it can be argued that the essence of politics is to augment fissures among the aggrieved sections of society. With this background, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) or the JeI riding the wave of the student protest, was only natural.
Indian media has also been clamouring that India was caught off-guard and hence could not assist Sheikh Hasina to deal with the protest in an effective manner. To address this, one has to appreciate the Bangladeshi socio-political landscape of recent times. The anti-India sentiment among the populace was quite palpable even before the protest. Anecdotal evidence of this would be, when, in a discussion with a Bangladeshi senior diplomat, the person highlighted that even natural phenomena like landslides in Bangladesh were blamed on India’s external intelligence agency in the social media. Thus, when the Editor of the Dhaka Tribune writes that there is an “antipathy” towards India, he is not exaggerating. It is also true that while there has been concentrated effort to build this anti-India narrative by vested interest groups, our own policies, both internal and external, in some cases, have only added fuel to the fire. Keeping this in mind, there is precious little which India could do to assist the previous government in Bangladesh in dealing with the protest, even when we had foreknowledge of it.
As we move forward now, both India and Bangladesh realise that there is a lot riding on the bonhomous relationship between the two neighbours. While political and media rhetoric on both sides continue, hard-nosed diplomats and policy makers would need to find pathways to reshape the relationship. In doing so, India faces four conundrums as highlighted in the recently released policy-paper by the Society to Harmonise Aspirations for Responsible Engagement (SHARE), a think-tank focusing on India’s northeast in relation to South and Southeast Asia.
Firstly, while New Delhi must allow Sheikh Hasina to stay in India for as long as she may please, this will no doubt irk the current regime in Dhaka and especially its loudest and most inexperienced constituency, the students. Secondly, while Bangladesh may not want to discuss security matters, examples are in abundance to demonstrate that economic development cannot be achieved without peace and security. Furthermore, while connectivity has been the cornerstone of Indo-Bangla engagements, India has to be mindful that these can also be leveraged by anti-India elements to disrupt the growth trajectory of our NE. Finally, while New Delhi would want to pursue a national policy vis-à-vis Dhaka, the reality is that such policy should emanate out of Agartala, Aizawl, Dispur and Shillong as they are also key constituents.
Indian media and the politicians will do a great service to the nation if the loud rhetoric is given a rest so that real issues can be discussed and debated in order to generate sound policy options from such samudra manthan. For instance, while the revoking of the ban on JeI has found prime slots in media, awful little is written about the Amir of Ansarullah Bangla Team, Jasimuddin Rahmani, been released from prison in Bangladesh or that several convicted terrorists having “escaped” from high-security prisons during the protests.
As we now move forward, appreciation of the actual centre of gravity (CoG) in Bangladeshi politics is the answer. As New Delhi recalibrates its approach towards Dhaka, it will be well-advised to direct its policies towards the people of Bangladesh and not the political elites in Gana Bhawan or State Guest House Jamuna. Short term interventions like reinstitution of Border Haats and increasing their scale, to hosting local football/cricket tournaments in the bordering areas with participation from both sides of the border will go a long way in rebuilding bridges among the peoples. In the medium to long term, operationalising the rupee-loan mechanism with an initial US$ 1 billion rupee-loan would add immediate impetus to the laggard Bangladeshi economy. Extending financing schemes to MSMEs of Bangladesh on the same line as we do for Indian ones would be a revolutionary and high-impact step that will broad-base the impact. While these are some prescriptions, addressing the primary constituency in Bangladesh, its populace, will need both political and diplomatic acumen of which India has proven to be capable of in the past.
Das is a strategic studies and research expert and governing body member of SHARE.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.
