Since my visit to Dhaka in 2010, Bangladesh has held three general elections, none was really free and fair. Many people in Bangladesh and overseas questioned the validity of these polls, saying they were heavily rigged in favour of the ruling party. Critics also saw an authoritarian streak in the way the country was governed—an outcome attributed largely to the absence of a strong opposition group in the parliament. These lapses point to some inherent weaknesses in parliamentary democracies.
In my upcoming book, ‘One Eleven Minus Two, Sheikh Hasina's War on Yunus and America,’ I have proposed some checks and balances to strengthen fledgling democracies like Bangladesh.
This idea was conceived in response to chronic battles between ruling and opposition political parties: The Awami League headed by Sheikh Hasina and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party controlled by Khaleda Zia. Both of them served as prime ministers. Hasina lost power in nationwide street protests and fled to neighbouring India on August 5. And, an ailing Khaleda won freedom from house arrest after Hasina quit. An interim administration, headed by Nobel Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, took over on August 8 to indefinitely run the country before holding new elections.
The street protests that removed Hasina from power this week is a fresh reminder that sick democracies need new medicines to grow into healthy governing systems. This is even more true for countries like Bangladesh which see more often than not power moves from one hand to another through violence than elections.
The proposed model, a blend of parliamentary and presidential systems with executive powers mostly vested in the prime minister, calls for directly electing the president. The plan is to give the president limited executive powers to call fresh general elections in the event the prime minister crosses the constitutional red line. This will keep the prime minister on notice that any deliberate and wilful deviation from the constitution and abuse of power will be disastrous for the administration.
The model also stipulates that parliamentary candidates be selected through primaries as in the United States to prevent political parties from selling nominations to the highest bidders, a trend that is all too prevalent in Bangladesh and undermines the electoral process.
In 2008, Iftekhar Chowdhury, then Bangladesh's foreign affairs adviser in the interim Fakhruddin Ahmed administration, talked about a proposal to this end. When the regime started thinking about giving power back to politicians, some of its members wanted political parties to accept a “Magna Carta,” which proposed that the president and prime minister share power to make the government strong.
In addition, it envisioned that the majority party would fill most of the cabinet seats but give some to other parties based on votes they win. The president would be responsible for protecting institutions, such as the military and the independent commissions. This would ensure civilian control, but achieve a balance of power.
The idea originated from the thinking that Bangladesh needed a government that did not exclude the opposition as in the past. By giving the losing political party a role in governance would Bangladesh be able to avoid having people take to the streets to protest election results.
A key element of the vision was strengthening the role of the presidency. The new president should be neutral, and independent of the ruling party. Such a figure would have a “moderating influence” and discourage the elected government from bad habits. Civil society-groups would play no role because many of them had become highly politicised, which diminished public respect for these institutions.
Preventing parliamentary autocracy
Despite having some good elements, Chowdhury's proposal lacked some crucial safeguards. To prevent a prime minister from turning autocratic, British-style democracies need more effective checks and balances. One way to achieve this is to have the president elected directly by the people.
Under my proposed presidential-parliamentary system, the president will have the power to dissolve parliament if the prime minister acts unlawfully. However, the prime minister will remain in office to hold a new election within 30 days. The interim prime minister will work strictly under the president's direction. The president must not appoint a new prime minister before the election. Only a parliament member supported by the majority can be prime minister.
The presidential election must be non-partisan. No political parties or civic groups will openly support or oppose a presidential candidate. All candidates shall receive tax money to meet campaign expenses. They must first prove eligibility by raising on their own a set percentage of their costs from individual donors. Spending and donations must be capped.
The president will be a watchdog over the prime minister. His authority to dissolve parliament and call fresh polls will keep the prime minister on notice that the government may face termination if it crosses the constitutional red line.
The Weimar Republic constitution gave this power to the German president, but it had a fatal flaw. It gave the president authority to issue decrees—even if they did not conform to the constitution—as long as they were backed by a two-thirds majority in parliament. This crack enabled Adolf Hitler to assume absolute power.
The proposed presidential-parliamentary system will have no such provision. In a nutshell, the president will have the power to only dissolve parliament and call new elections. He shall not make laws or rule by decrees. If a national emergency arises, the president will summon the parliament to an emergency session.
Some may fear that a non-executive president who possesses effective powers of discretionary intervention may oppose the elected government and cause a divisive power struggle, as happened in Sri Lanka in 2018 and years ago in Pakistan. This fear is unfounded. Unlike the system in Sri Lanka or Pakistan, this proposed system will give the president no power to appoint a new prime minister without approval from parliament.
Furthermore, the constitution will mandate that a fresh election be held within 30 days. This will kill any temptation by the president to assume direct control because of the short duration for which he will exercise executive authority. Also, the dismissed prime minister will stay in office until the new election, a step that will serve as another deterrent against any possible ill intention on the part of the president.
There might still be worries that a malevolent president might instigate the military or other groups against the prime minister. Again, this is highly unlikely. As long as the government remains popular, neither the president nor the military will dare to undermine the prime minister, because in the event a government is fired, the new election must take place within 30 days and the same prime minister is likely to be re-elected.
The system in place now in such countries as India and Bangladesh does not deter a prime minister from abusing power. Under the parliamentary system, the president is titular because he is chosen by ruling party lawmakers, which puts him at the mercy of the prime minister. The constitution denies the president any authority to take a stand against the prime minister even if the prime minister goes nuts. This is exactly what happened when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed an emergency in India in 1975—the president stood by as a silent spectator.
In addition to preventing the prime minister from morphing into an autocrat, the elected head of state will also eliminate the need for an interim caretaker government that opposition parties in Bangladesh demanded as a way to ensure free and fair elections. Under a non-partisan president, parliamentary polls will be free and fair, because he will be even-handed. The caretaker concept is faulty also because it puts the country under an unelected government every five years, a serious deviation from democratic norms that make the rulers accountable to the people. Is it a wise idea for a nation to give an unelected government to make a major decision, such as declaring war?
Does unity government work?
Some critics argue that the winner-take-all setup in the parliamentary system is the real culprit behind political unrest in many instances. As a remedy, they suggest that the ruling party share power with the opposition—give cabinet seats to opposition parties based on their number of members in parliament.
The idea of an inclusive cabinet is unrealistic and inherently flawed because ministers coming from different political shades will clash over policy matters. Opposition, by nature, will seek to bring the government down in an effort to capture total power. The opposition will also seek to ensure that the dominant coalition partner wins no extra mileage from any policy adopted by the government.
This is exactly what happened in the League-Congress joint interim cabinet in 1946 in British India. Finance Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, a Muslim League leader, stopped funding jobs proposed by Home Minister Vallabhbhai Patel, a Congress man. Ali Khan feared Congress was filling top positions with its supporters to create an advantage for itself. This obstructionist step pushed Patel over the edge to favour India's partition rather than have the Muslim League in a united India with a veto power.
Under the proposed hybrid system, giving a few parliamentary committee chairmanships to the opposition sounds more like a workable solution. Even better would be to have a Westminster-type shadow cabinet. Unlike the British system, all the shadow ministers would be given cabinet status under my system to keep the opposition happy. The number of shadow members would be equal to the number of cabinet members, who would only monitor their respective ministries and report their findings to parliament, a step that will keep the ministers on their toes.
The directly elected president, because of his legitimacy from voters, would be a pillar of strength for the judiciary and other constitutional officers — they would act more independently under the president than under an autocratic prime minister. Judges and constitutional officers buckle under pressure, as happened in India under Indira Gandhi.
Many young nations adopted the British system before thinking through. They lack institutions to resolve critical governance issues. Politics in these nations revolves around personalities. When Bangladesh faced turmoil in 2006, for example, it sought to replace old guards with new faces, and Nobel winner Muhammad Yunus’s name popped up. It is the same again this time around. No one has ventured that the real solution lies in building the right institutions, not in dazzling personalities.
In Britain and Japan, for example, monarchs are highly respected. They exert a moderating influence on politicians. In fact, in 2019 Malaysia's King Al-Sultan Abdullah used his powers to chart the nation's political course when he ended months of political turmoil by naming a new prime minister.
Weak institutions often spell doom and gloom for a nation. When Pakistan's Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin was abruptly fired by the governor general in 1953, the Supreme Court upheld the decision, putting the first nail in the coffin of democracy in Pakistan. On the contrary, Sri Lanka's Supreme Court saved democracy in 2018 by declaring the dismissal of the prime minister illegal.
Parliamentary democracies face yet another issue—how to select candidates for top elected offices. Political parties often sell nominations to the highest bidders or pick muscle men. Parties must pick nominees via primary elections, as in America.
Even after putting all these measures in place, budding democracies must walk one more step, a crucial one: Localities must have the power to levy taxes and spend tax money as they see fit. Many nations have vested economic control in the central government. Local governments, as a result, rely on the prime minister. This dependency hurts progress. Whoever controls the purse strings enjoys the power.
Local government leaders cannot carry out their work. They lack qualified professionals. Community participation in decision-making is limited. Money is barely enough. Less than one per cent of Bangladesh's gross domestic product funds 85 per cent of local development costs. Local governments generate very little of their own revenue. Dhaka, for example, raises $10 per capita per year while Ethiopian cities average $66.
Taxes must be reasonably shared by local and national governments as needed. In America, for example, federal and state governments share personal income tax; states share sales and land taxes with localities. This system will give local elected officials the freedom to decide what is best for their people. Right now, they depend on the prime minister to fund their projects. This idea is certain to face stiff resistance from politicians; they see this as a prescription to erode their power base. Civil society must make people aware of this and push politicians to accept it.
Khasru, a US-based journalist, is author of ‘Myths and Facts Bangladesh Liberation War: How India, US, China and USSR Shaped the Outcome’, and ‘The Bangladesh Military Coup and the CIA Link’
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK
