During a trip to Bangladesh in 2010, I asked several journalists at the Dhaka Press Club why Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina went after Muhammad Yunus, the U.S.-trained, Grameen Bank-famed, development economist who dazzled his fellow Bengalis as a 2006 Nobel Prize winner.
I got two answers: One, she got upset because the microfinance pioneer supported Bangladeshi military's plan to banish the nation's top two politicians from politics; Hasina took this as a ploy by Yunus to replace them with himself. Two, Hasina was upset with Yunus because he won the Nobel Prize. She perceived that Yunus somehow manipulated the Nobel committee through strong-armed lobbying with help from his American friend, Bill Clinton, former U.S. president. According to this theory, she believed she deserved the prize for her role in ending a decades-old tribal insurgency in eastern Bangladesh.
With Yunus heading the interim administration following Hasina's ouster on 5 August, one may say the toppled prime minister's fear was not really unfounded. In fact, just days before Hasina was ousted by a popular upsurge, Yunus sought foreign intervention in Bangladesh to end mass street protests, a forecast that prompted Hasina's supporters to brand Yunus as a traitor to his fatherland. But others argued that Yunus hinted at India, because he also said New Delhi was supporting a wrong friend in Bangladesh. Hasina's backers saw the invisible hand of Uncle Sam, who was perceived to be unkind to the ousted leader.
Yunus' coming to power reminds one of the scenario under which Benito Mussolini became Italy's prime minister. In 1922, tens of thousands of armed fascists marched on Rome, demanding Mussolini be named prime minister. Italy’s King, Victor Emmanuel, refused to declare a state of emergency and impose martial law. Instead he dissolved the government and asked Mussolini to form a new one.
On 6 August, a day after Hasina took refuge in neighboring India, the agitating student leaders asked Yunus to run the country. The economist, who taught in Tennessee before returning home in the early 1970s, was sworn in on August 8 and the parliament was dissolved. He said he could not turn down the request this time around, even though he refused a similar offer in 2007 because he realized the peril of being an unelected ruler. Even a few months ago, he ruled out the possibility of entering politics, saying he was not cut out for it.
He, however, had supported a military plan to exile Hasina and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, who leads the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, abroad in an attempt to clean up messy Bengali politics. Shortly thereafter, being prodded by some “pseudolectuals,” or the so-called civil-society members, he floated a political outfit to contest parliament elections, but quit within weeks because his behind-the-scenes backers refused to join him.
Yet, Hasina was unsure what Yunus really had up in his sleeve. After Hasina's landslide victory in elections in 2008, she declared war on Yunus and his main backer, the United States. In 2011, Yunus was removed from the Grameen Bank. Many critics called it Hasina's personal vendetta because he had unsuccessfully conspired with the country's all-powerful military to banish Hasina and Khaleda from Bangladesh.
No one has fully explained the complex web of thinking that vitiated the prime minister's mind. She remained steadfast to remove Yunus, ignoring howls from his influential friends, including then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
The myth that Hasina was upset because Yunus won the Nobel prize had no factual basis; it stemmed from statements by her aides. Hasina was miffed by Yunus' statement that 8.5 million Grameen members were not only citizens but also voters. This was a veiled threat that these voters could punch a mega hole in the Awami League's ballot box.
Still, it does not fully explain why Hasina put Yunus on her list of the condemned. To dig deeper, another question needs to be answered: If Yunus favored banishing both Hasina and Zia, why did the BNP chief come out in support of him? Not only did Zia hug Yunus, but she also exhorted Washington and London to protect the embattled professor from Hasina's fury.
In fact, Hasina's perception that Yunus was in bed with Zia doomed the professor. Her suspicion had merits. To understand fully one needs to step back to the early 1970s when Yunus returned home from the United States after Bangladesh became independent. After a stint at a government job, he started teaching at the University of Chittagong in eastern Bangladesh.
In 1975, Hasina's father was killed in a violent military coup. Eventually, Zia's husband, General Ziaur Rahman, deputy army chief at the time of the putsch, captured power following several coups and countercoups. Hasina remained convinced that the general connived with her father's killers.
Yunus, who was then experimenting with his microcredit program, got in touch with Ziaur Rahman in the late 1970s. By then the general had become president of the country and crafted an ambitious blueprint for a prolonged tenure. The professor sold the idea of the Gram Sarkar (village government) to the military strongman. The general ran with it, making it a catalyst of his political strategy intended to win public support in rural Bangladesh. Ziaur Rahman was assassinated in 1981 and his experiment came to a grinding halt. Shortly afterward, his widow, Khaleda Zia, became BNP chief.
Then in 1996, Yunus joined the non-party interim government as a BNP nominee. To the Awami League, this further indicated his hobnobbing with the political group that Hasina must defeat in the polls to rule Bangladesh. Despite these concerns, Yunus was still in Hasina's good graces. Hasina, who was not yet on firm ground in the political landscape of Bangladesh, followed an electoral strategy that focused on winning over influential people rather than antagonizing them. So, she promoted the microcredit concept in 1997 at a conference in Washington, D.C., which she attended as prime minister. The same year, she skipped two better qualified candidates to grant Yunus a license to start GrameenPhone, now a mighty wireless phone company in Bangladesh.
Deliberately or not, Yunus failed to return Hasina's favor. He did not visit her in hospital after an armed attack on her life at a political rally in Dhaka in 2004, an event Hasina thinks was perpetrated by the BNP. Yunus failed to wish her speedy recovery, a sore point on Hasina's mind, Hasina's Foreign Minister Dr. Dipu Moni fumed to U.S. Ambassador James Moriarty.
Grameen plans alarm Hasina
Hasina also smelled rats when Yunus sought approval for several new Grameen projects. He wanted to create medical colleges, nursing schools, shoe-manufacturing and food-production ventures. She interpreted this massive undertaking to expand Grameen's empire as an attempt by Yunus to further solidify his hold on the nation.
In September 2009, Melanne Verveer, the first U.S. ambassador for Global Women’s Issues in the Obama administration, informed Secretary Hillary Clinton about a conversation she had had with Yunus regarding how Hasina stalled Grameen initiatives.
Yunus complained to Verveer that Hasina was making his life difficult: “She is making any progress very difficult. The health project he discussed with you can't get OKs... If she hears it's Grameen, she stands in way of licenses... There is some deep personal antagonism that he can't fathom...,” Verveer relayed to the secretary in an email, quoting Yunus.
Yunus wanted the United States to be a peacemaker, but Hasina saw Washington as a war-monger. She received a phone call from Clinton, who asked why Yunus was removed from the bank. Hasina replied she had nothing to do with it; it was a court decision. America's interference set off an alarm bell in Hasina's belly. On 16 September 2009, she alerted the countrymen to the ongoing conspiracy of a “special quarter” and “undemocratic forces” who were still plotting to wipe out democracy and grab power.
Hasina had reasons to be panicked. Her new government was shaky. Just six months earlier, she had quelled a bloody rebellion by a paramilitary force in the capital city of Dhaka. The brutal killing of dozens of Army officers by the Bangladesh Rifles border guards took place just a month after her return to power in January 2009. During this time, Hasina was under constant pressure from Washington to hold new elections to accommodate Zia, who had boycotted the elections fearing vote rigging. Washington also pressed Hasina to make amends with Yunus.
Hasina perceived Yunus to be a pro-BNP element, even though the economist denied having any links with any political party. She thought America wanted to put Yunus in power along with Khaleda Zia. Dr. Kamal Hossain, Yunus' lawyer and a former foreign minister of Bangladesh, believed Hasina acted based on rumors, nothing else. Yunus' assumption of power proved Hasina was right.
Yunus faces tough time ahead
Now Hasina is out and Yunus is in. He might smell poetic justice in Hasina's demise and savor his sweet victory. But he faces an enormously tough time ahead as Bangladesh's ruler. Students pushed him into the limelight, but their honeymoon with the economically hit, violence-infected nation of 170 million Bengalis will soon be over. The country is not under his control yet. Unruly mobs rule Bangladesh now.
Yunus has no political structure to count on nor will he receive the full backing of the military, which has no real stake in his administration. It would be a miracle if he could effectively govern without support from a political group or the military. The army chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, is a weak leader, and the military is now tilted more toward the right, a perfect recipe for trouble. The only possible group that might come to the interim leader's rescue for a short time is the theocratic Jamaat-e-Islami, an outfit that both America and India would hate to see in power. Jamaat's cooperation would be aimed at its long-term goal to capture total power. The United States opposed the 2007 military plan to banish Hasina and Khaleda because it feared Jamaat would fill the void. Even if Yunus, who is 84 years old, manages to bring the military, the BNP, and Jamaat under his control, he might end up being the Hamid Karzai of Bangladesh.
Right now, the most pressing task facing Yunus is to restore order and get the government machinery working again to restart the economic engine, a very tall order indeed. Foreign investors are scared like hell right now to go to Bangladesh. The country is in the worst shape since its birth in 1971; it has completely melted down. The garment industry, the main part of the economy, would soon see the fallout of the turmoil.
In foreign affairs, Yunus has already made a blunder by publicly venting that India had been supporting the wrong friend —Hasina— in Bangladesh. When General Zia, who ran Bangladesh from 1975-81, faced difficulty with India, he took a tough line. But G.W. Chowdhury, then a professor in North Carolina who was invited to be the regime's foreign minister, advised the general to go easy on India. He reasoned that if India did something to Bangladesh, everybody would make statements at the United Nations, but none would actually give any material help. Zia heeded Chowdhury's advice.
(B. Z. Khasru, a U.S.-based journalist, is author of Myths and Facts Bangladesh Liberation War: How India, U.S., China and USSR Shaped the Outcome, and The Bangladesh Military Coup and the CIA Link. His new book, One Eleven, Minus Two Prime Minister Hasina's War on Yunus and America, will be released shortly.)
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK
