Why India needs a proactive coastal security mechanism

People live on land and are well versed with the way security works where there is ground under one’s feet. The sea is an alien environment. There are no roads, physical borders, traffic signs or police on the beat. The philosophy of operations and hence, concepts of security, on land and on and over the sea are vastly different. Over land, it is all about preserving territorial integrity, denial of space to inimical elements and access control. Over the sea, it is about freedom and unhindered access. The sea is a ‘common good’ for all of humanity and hence the rules are different.

Land has well-defined borders, marked and guarded. Even where they are not so clear, there is a sense of territorial ownership, albeit opportune, in concepts such as the Line of Control, Line of Actual Control and Working Boundary. At sea there are no such things. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) segregates maritime zones broadly into four categories. For the moment, it will suffice to understand that there is something called a ‘baseline’ along the coast from where measurements are taken.

*Internal waters are those that lie landward of the baseline.

*Territorial waters extend till 12 nautical miles from the baseline over which the coastal state exercises national jurisdiction, including in the airspace above it. All ships and vessels enjoy the right of ‘innocent passage’ even in the territorial waters of another state, which means that they are permitted to traverse these waters as long as they do not indulge in activities detrimental to the interests of the coastal state.

*The contiguous zone extends 24 nautical miles from the baseline where the coastal state’s fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws can be enforced.

*The exclusive economic zone extends up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline in which the coastal state enjoys exclusive rights for economic exploitation of the sea and the seabed.

Two hundred nautical miles around the Indian landmass and island territories amount to a staggering area of 2.2 million square kilometres. There are a large number of agencies that are responsible for coastal security such as the Coast Guard, customs, immigration, revenue intelligence, fisheries, oil and gas operators, port authorities, state police forces and a host of government departments from the Centre and the states. While each has its own charter, coordination continues to be a nightmare. Besides, there are organisational shortcomings and capability gaps that adversely affect the coastal security preparedness of the country.

The 26/11 attacks exposed serious shortcomings in our coastal security apparatus. In its wake, the government established state marine police departments, carved out of the regular police forces, and established coastal police stations. Several other schemes were initiated and the Navy was made responsible for overall maritime security, including coastal defence. The director general, Coast Guard, was designated as commander, coastal security, with Coast Guard as the lead intelligence agency for this purpose. A national maritime security coordinator was recently appointed at the apex-level with state maritime security coordinators in coastal states. However, several inadequacies, mostly because of organisational impediments, lack of capability with state marine police forces and turf-guarding by stakeholders, need to be addressed urgently.

The Navy and the Coast Guard function under different departments of the ministry of defence, which is detrimental to synergy. The Coast Guard is a paramilitary force that must have complete responsibility for coastal security in territorial waters in less-than-war situations. The Navy should be called in only if the Coast Guard is incapable of managing a situation. Like every other paramilitary force, the Coast Guard would be best placed under the border management division of the home ministry and placed under orders of the Navy in conflict. Alternatively, it could be placed under the department of military affairs of the defence ministry.

The nation deserves a robust and proactive coastal security mechanism so that the embarrassment of 26/11 is never repeated. If another breach occurs 15 years after gun-toting terrorists strolled into Mumbai through a bustling fishing village and held the nation hostage, there will be nobody to blame but ourselves. It is not that the inadequacies are unknown. The will and urgency to address them is the need of the hour.