Why Manipur government wants the Assam Rifles replaced?

The generals, men in khaki, bureaucrats and kurta-clad politicians have all put on their thinking hats to reevaluate the role of the Assam Rifles in Manipur. The two-century-old force, which is called the ‘Sentinels of the Northeast’, is now facing what some may term an existential crisis.

The Assam Rifles came into being in 1835 as a militia called the Cachar Levy. It was formed with 750 men, mainly to protect British tea estates and settlements against tribal raiders. Later, it was renamed the Frontier Force and its role was expanded to carrying out “punitive expeditions” across the borders of Assam. The force was merged with three Assam military police battalions in 1870. It saw action during World War I―around 3,000 men were sent to Europe and the Middle East―and got its current name in 1917. Its strength today stands at 46 battalions and the primary role has evolved into counterinsurgency in the northeast and security along the borders with Myanmar under control of the Indian Army (it is headed by a lieutenant general rank officer, with sector headquarters commanded by brigadiers).

The Manipur violence has led to heated debates between the critics and supporters of the paramilitary force. Multiple options are now being considered. Should the Assam Rifles be relieved from the Myanmar border and tasked only with counterinsurgency? Or vice versa? Or, should there be a radical change in the form, shape and control of the force? These are some of the questions before the authorities.

There is a demand from the Manipur government to replace the Assam Rifles with a new, dedicated border force for its districts lying near the Myanmar border. The Biren Singh regime wants this new force to have a proper chain of border outposts so as to act as the first line of defence against rampant cross-border smuggling of drugs and weapons by insurgents and the entry of illegal immigrants from Myanmar. The state security officials say that if the Centre deploys a dedicated border force, then the state’s own police units will become the second line of defence, thereby strengthening the security grid.

In the current scenario, though the Union defence ministry, through the Army, has operational control of the Assam Rifles, the Union home ministry has administrative control. Turf wars between the ministries have led to several draft notes reaching the cabinet committee on security, during the NDA and UPA regimes, seeking to replace the Assam Rifles with either the Indo-Tibetan Border Police or the Border Security Force. Both these central armed police forces are under the home ministry’s control, but, these ideas were shot down following the intervention of the generals.

In 2019, then Army chief General Bipin Rawat told Defence Minister Rajnath Singh that the Assam Rifles must be strengthened to respond to border threats and counter armed insurgents who are active in Manipur and have operational bases in Myanmar.

While the home ministry has long felt the need to implement the Kargil Review Committee’s recommendation of “one border, one force”, there is a realisation now that a more holistic approach is needed to enhance national security, both along the border and internally.

“There has to be effective coordination between the state government and the border guarding forces,” said retired Lt Gen Shokin Chauhan, former director general of the Assam Rifles. “Each force needs to build its capability to tackle threats ranging from law and order to counterinsurgency. The strength of the Assam Rifles needs to be doubled because the force needs to be in full strength if it has to be on the frontline like the BSF and other central armed police forces. We are not dealing with cattle smugglers here.”

The home ministry realises that before it takes a call on which force will guard the vulnerable international border in Manipur, it first has to build all-weather roads and create border outposts at an interval of 10km-15km so that security personnel can cover the area by foot or mobile patrolling. A senior home ministry official said that the local villagers must be included in the security plans to elicit their support in establishing the outposts and for area domination in times of crisis. “As many as 46 border outposts will be needed, which means doubling the strength of the border guarding force to man these posts,” the official added.

When it comes to the state police forces, their vulnerability in conflict zones has been seen many times in Jammu and Kashmir and northeastern states. “The survivability of a state police post with a dozen men is near-impossible in these areas as they can be overrun by a group of guerrillas (insurgents) anytime,” said Lt Gen Chauhan. Also, state police forces often feel the pulls and pressures of their political bosses, thereby constraining their growth. This is why the central armed police forces or the Army step in. Manipur is no different.

At the same time, creating an effective border infrastructure in such tough terrain is not a day’s job. It takes several initiatives and work can take years to complete. After all, the neglect has gone on for decades.

The police infrastructure in the hills need immediate attention and so does road connectivity and basic facilities in border villages.

Bringing telecom companies to instal towers in the vicinity of outposts and asking the state police to create contingency plans to provide assistance in times of crisis are the next steps.

The violence in Manipur may not be a direct outcome of external pulls and pressures, rather an assertion of ethnic identities that fear a slow erosion of their roots. But, between the fear and the fight, there is now a realisation that violence makes the border state more vulnerable. Especially when drones and gunshots fly within Myanmar and insurgent groups are coming out of hiding.