How BJP beat anti-incumbency in Haryana

The BJP also played smart in seat distribution by replacing most sitting MLAs

PTI10_08_2024_000428B Three cheers: Haryana Chief Minister Nayab Singh Saini greets supporters after winning the elections from Ladwa constituency | PTI

A WEEK IS A long time in politics,” said former British prime minister Harold Wilson. His words rung true in Haryana on October 8, as the ruling BJP, in a major turn of events, created history by scoring a hat-trick win in the agrarian state, defying all predictions. It won 48 seats, eight more than it got last time, comfortably crossing the half way mark in the 90-member assembly.

Most observers got it wrong as they predicted a Congress win as the situation on the ground suggested strong anti-incumbency against the BJP, fuelled by discontent among the dominant Jat community, the wrestlers’ protest, opposition to the Agnipath scheme and rising unemployment.

What then turned the tide? Many believe that the shift began with the “parchi-kharchi” jibe by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a rally in Kurukshetra on September 27. It referred to the 10-year Congress rule in the state, from 2004 to 2014, when jobs allegedly could be secured only through recommendation or bribes. “This narrative of corruption and nepotism associated with the Hoodas neutralised the issue of unemployment,” said Rajendra Sharma, professor of political science, Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak. The Jat vs non-Jat narrative, too, hurt the Congress. While the Jats voted overwhelmingly for the Congress, other communities looked at alternatives, mainly the BJP. Said Satish Tyagi, a political analyst, “Putting Bhupinder Hooda in a commanding position polarised non-Jats much more than anyone anticipated. It stirred the latent fears of Jatshahi (Jat dominance) that historically exists in Haryana.”

The BJP capitalised on the situation, focusing on strong messaging and grassroots mobilisation. The party countered each and every issue of discontent. While the local political machinery skilfully emphasised development initiatives and social welfare schemes, party leaders stoked fears that the Congress was fighting only for a single community. Sources said that the RSS, too, mobilised its cadre, which directly communicated the benefits of the welfare schemes to the rural populace.

The BJP also exploited divisions within the Congress, particularly between former chief minister Hooda and Lok Sabha MP Kumari Selja. While Hooda, a Jat leader, was given a free hand by the high command, Selja, who is the face of the dalit community, made her displeasure felt over the allocation of seats (Hooda selected 72 of 90 candidates) and marginalisation. She was even denied the opportunity to contest. The narrative managed to rally the support of voters inherently apprehensive of Jat domination. “It seems that just a couple of days before polling about 10 per cent of the votes shifted to the BJP,” said Tyagi.

The BJP’s project of wooing the dalits and the OBCs had been initiated with the replacement of Manohar Lal Khattar with OBC leader Nayab Singh Saini as chief minister in March. To placate the two groups, the BJP promised gas cylinders at Rs500 to families below poverty line, full scholarship to scheduled caste and OBC students in government medical and engineering colleges, loans up to Rs25 lakh for OBC entrepreneurs and two lakh government jobs. For farmers, the government agreed to procure 23 crops at minimum support price and for Agniveers, it extended significant benefits including a 10 per cent horizontal reservation in government recruitment and interest-free loans up to Rs5 lakh. “The dalits and the OBCs were never much against the BJP and because certain measures were taken by the Saini government in the past few weeks, the dissatisfaction among them were taken care of to a large extent,” said Tyagi.

Besides, the BJP was smarter in ticket distribution. It replaced 25 of its 40 sitting MLAs, while the Congress repeated all its 28 MLAs, of whom 15 lost. Of the 47 seats where the dalit population is 20 per cent or more, the BJP won 38 seats and of the 17 reserved seats, it won seven seats, improving its tally by two from 2019. Said Rajiv Singh, professor, Central University of Haryana, “No one understood the silent voter who became the deciding factor.”

Another advantage the BJP seems to have got is the fragmentation of opposition votes as the Congress and the Aam Aadmi Party could not seal an alliance unlike in the Lok Sabha polls. The fact that the AAP polled more votes than the BJP’s victory margin in at least three seats points to this fact.

On the other hand, the over emphasis on the Jat vote bank backfired for the Congress. The party fielded 32 per cent Jat candidates against the BJP’s 17 per cent. “The Congress tried to bring about a collaboration between the dominant and the marginalised segments of the society in Haryana without any robust plan,” said Singh. “That proved to be a huge mistake.”

The Haryana verdict shows that while the BJP learned its lessons from the parliamentary elections, the Congress failed to take its gains forward. “The organisational paucity and insufficient mobilisation of the Congress is clear from the results in Haryana,” said Sharma. Marred by overconfidence, wrong messaging and strategic miscalculations, the Congress gave the victory away on a platter.

For the BJP, the win signifies a strong mandate that could bolster its strategy in upcoming assembly elections. While anti-incumbency was palpable in Haryana, the BJP’s victory demonstrates that effective messaging, targeted outreach and the ability to navigate a divided opposition can beat the odds.