Nearly three decades since it was founded, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference finds itself at a crossroads. The reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir into a Union territory in August 2019, and the arrest and imprisonment of several Hurriyat leaders in the lead-up to it, have politically marginalised the once-powerful umbrella body of separatists. Chances of a revival appear rather slim, since several of its key members are either dead or facing long prison terms.
The Hurriyat was formed on July 31, 1993, by separatist parties with disparate ideologies. The objective was to create a political platform that would complement the armed struggle that took root in Kashmir in the late 1980s. The Hurriyat was the brainchild of Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, preacher and custodian of the Jamia Masjid in Srinagar, the most influential mosque in the valley. Mirwaiz was just 19 when he brought together separatist organisations on a common platform; his father, Mirwaiz Muhammad Farooq, had been shot dead by unidentified gunmen nearly three years earlier.
The Hurriyat was considered the rebirth of the Muslim Mutahida Mahaz (Muslim United Front, or MUF), a coalition of parties with separatist leanings that challenged the National Conference in the 1987 assembly polls. The ruling coalition of the NC and the Congress had rigged the elections, sowing the seeds of militancy in the valley. After the polls, MUF supporters were among the first to cross the Line of Control for arms training.
The Hurriyat had a two-tier structure—a seven-member executive body and a general council of nearly two dozen members. The executive body—which comprised Mirwaiz and separatist leaders Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Yasin Malik, Abdul Gani Lone, Prof Abdul Gani Bhat and Sheikh Abdul Aziz—took all decisions after consulting the general council.
The Hurriyat’s constitution described it as a union of political, social and religious parties that waged a “peaceful struggle” for resolving the “Kashmir dispute”, either as per the UN resolution in 1948 (which had recommended that India hold a plebiscite) or through tripartite talks involving India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir.
The Hurriyat became a dominant force in the early 1990s, when insurgency was on the rise and the imposition of President’s rule sidelined mainstream political parties. It retained its influence even after the 1996 elections, the first in six years after the assembly was dissolved in January 1990.
Differences over the role of the armed struggle and the need for peace talks with New Delhi divided the Hurriyat into moderate and hardliner factions. The moderates, led by Mirwaiz, Bhat and Lone, supported talks with the Union government. The hardliners led by Geelani demanded that the 1948 UN resolution be implemented. As a precondition for peace talks, they insisted that New Delhi accept Kashmir as a dispute involving Pakistan. The stance struck a chord with militants and their supporters in Pakistan.
The hawk of the hurriyat: Syed Ali Shah Geelani (wearing cap) with supporters in Srinagar in 2004 | AP
Ties between the two factions deteriorated after Lone was shot dead in Srinagar on May 21, 2002, at a rally organised to commemorate the death anniversary of Mirwaiz’s father. The split came a year later, when Hurriyat chairman rejected Geelani’s demand that Lone’s son Sajjad Lone be expelled for fielding proxy candidates in the assembly polls in 2002. Yasin Malik, a prominent member of the hardline faction, went his own way after the split. He later became leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
The moderates backed Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf’s four-point formula on Kashmir, which envisaged demilitarisation and self-rule on both sides of the LoC, free movement across the LoC, and joint management of sectors such as water resources without changing existing international boundaries. Geelani rejected the plan. On January 22, 2004, deputy prime minister L.K. Advani hosted Mirwaiz and other moderates in Delhi.
Peace talks with Hizbul Mujahideen, which had announced a ceasefire in 2000, continued even after the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance came to power at the Centre in 2004. In September 2005 and May 2006, prime minister Manmohan Singh met with a delegation of moderates led by Mirwaiz. The meetings resulted in the Centre allowing them to travel in a passenger bus connecting Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pak-occupied Kashmir, to mobilise support for a peace deal. The visit was considered an achievement for separatists, especially the moderates in the Hurriyat, and a step towards solving the Kashmir issue. Musharraf’s Kashmir formula, however, stalled after he lost power and New Delhi saw a change of guard.
The hardliners clawed back in 2008, by launching an agitation against the decision of the state government to allot land to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) in Ganderbal district. After more than 60 people were killed in firing by security forces, the government cancelled the allotment of land to defuse the crisis. Masarat Alam Bhat, who led protests against the Army for killing three civilians in a fake encounter at Machil in 2010, gained prominence as a possible heir to Geelani. Alam evaded arrest for four months, denting the credibility of the ruling NC-Congress alliance and forcing the Centre to call an all-party meeting on Kashmir in Delhi. In the four months before normalcy was restored, more than 100 people were shot dead by security forces.
As the hardliners emerged stronger, the moderates faced internal issues. The crisis deepened after Bhat said that the 1948 UN resolution was outdated and impractical, and suggested creating a common minimum agenda with the NC and the opposition Peoples Democratic Party to settle the Kashmir issue. Bhat’s remarks led to a rebellion in the moderate ranks. Disillusioned with Mirwaiz’s leadership, many dissidents crossed over to Geelani’s side.
Despite their differences, Geelani, Mirwaiz and Malik came together to form the Joint Resistance Leadership in 2016, after Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani was killed in an encounter. The aftermath left Kashmir scarred. More than 100 people were shot dead, and scores were wounded by pellets fired by security forces to quell protests. It created a rift in the BJP-PDP coalition, which had come to power in 2015. The BJP wanted to act against the separatists, but the PDP feared further damage to its image and refused to cooperate. The BJP had its way in 2017, when the National Investigation Agency arrested members of the Hurriyat and other separatist groups on charges of “terror funding”.
Malik was arrested in February 2019 for his alleged involvement in terrorism and secessionist activities. He also faced multiple charges under the stringent Unlawful Activities Prevention Act. A month later, Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest socioreligious organisation in Kashmir that is sympathetic to the separatist cause, was banned.
The arrest of Hurriyat leaders and the subsequent communication lockdown prevented a public backlash against the scrapping of Article 370 in August 2019. Geelani, who had once warned the government of dire consequences if Article 370 was annulled, said he was “distancing” himself from the Hurriyat. Weakened by years of detention at home, the patriarch of the separatist movement died in Srinagar on September 1, 2021, at the age of 91. His funeral was held under police supervision to prevent protests.
Malik was convicted on May 19 this year and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He is also being tried for his alleged involvement in the 1989 abduction of Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of former chief minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, and the killing of four Air Force personnel in 1990. Geelani’s death and Yasin’s conviction have dealt a double blow to the separatist cause.
In the absence of Geelani and Malik, Mirwaiz has the difficult task of reviving the Hurriyat on his own. He has been in house arrest since August 5, 2019, while his seniormost colleagues, Bhat and former Hurriyat chairman Mohammad Abbas Ansari, are in their eighties and not keeping well.
Known for his nuanced views, Mirwaiz has been guarded in issuing statements in the past three years. He has responded cautiously to the J&K administration’s decision to disallow prayers at the Jamia Masjid over fears of separatist outpourings. The mosque, which doubles as the Mirwaiz family’s seat of power, has held Friday prayers only twice in the past 30 months. On April 9, a day after the prayer was last held, the police arrested 13 people and charged them under the stringent Public Safety Act (PSA) for allegedly raising anti-national slogans.
The government has been proactive in marginalising the separatists. It has been sacking government employees sympathetic to the separatist cause, and detaining suspects under the PSA. Around 500 Kashmiris have been charged under provisions of the law, and some are interned in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh because prisons in Jammu and Kashmir are full.
Observers say the Hurriyat’s silence on recent developments shows that it has lost its writ. “The Hurriyat has become redundant,” said Prof Noor Ahmed Baba, former head of the department of political science at the University of Kashmir in Srinagar. “Hurriyat leaders who are not in jail have not been active. As an organisation, the Hurriyat used to connect with the people, but that has not been the case for the past several years.”
What are the chances of a revival? “None in the given political context,” said Baba. “That could be unfortunate, because extremists can fill the gap.”
A senior JKLF leader and former militant commander said the Hurriyat had reached a dead end. It used to attract international attention—it was granted observer status in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) at the instance of Pakistan, and American and European Union diplomats used to regularly meet Hurriyat leaders for briefings on Kashmir. The situation, however, has changed. “The Kashmir conflict is of no concern to the US and the EU,” said the JKLF leader. “Pakistan also has withdrawn support. So it became easy for the BJP to come down hard [on the Hurriyat].”
Bhat, however, said the Hurriyat needed to be understood not as a political structure but as the “manifestation of a collective sentiment rooted in the history of the Kashmir dispute”. “The sentiment sometimes assumes the form of a structure—like the Hurriyat or the Plebiscite Front,” he said.
It means the Hurriyat may have lost its relevance and influence, but the sentiment that it tries to represent remains widespread in Kashmir. A new separatist grouping, along the lines of the Hurriyat, could well emerge in the future.