THE WISE SAY THERE is method in madness, or even in mayhem. For about 45 minutes on December 9, it was pure mayhem as punches and melee weapons like clubs flew free in the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh. It was a brutal hand-to-hand combat between a company of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a company of the Indian Army, comprising soldiers from the Sikh Light Infantry, Jat Regiment and Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry. A company usually consists of about 80-100 soldiers. But reinforcements rushed in, and the brawl only got more ferocious, resulting in significant injuries on both sides.
A reliable source told THE WEEK that the clash began with a war of words when the PLA patrol team transgressed into a well-manned Indian Army post. It eventually led to fisticuffs and a physical brawl using clubs. The Indians had an upper hand for most of the fight. “When the PLA beat a hasty retreat, a few PLA soldiers and an officer were made to remain with the Indian soldiers for a few hours. Later on, of course, they were allowed to leave,”the source said. It took a flag meeting between local commanders on December 11 to ease the tension.
The sparring spot is a usual suspect: Yangtse, which has the Bom 6 peak—about 17,000ft high—and ridges that provide commanding views of both Indian and Chinese territories. But more importantly, a few of these ridges offer a clear view of the tracks that lead to Tibet’s Cona County. This is not the first time Yangtse has witnessed a clash—on September 28, 2021, the PLA had tried to occupy the peak but was beaten back by an alert Indian Army.
Yangtse is about a day’s perilous drive northeast from Tawang. It is located north of a scenic waterfall that is considered to be a sacred spot for the Monpas, a local tribal community that follows Tibetan Buddhism. The waterfall, just south of Bom 6, is located at about 14,500ft. Legend has it that the waterfall was created after a mythical showdown between Padmasambhava, one of the most revered masters in Tibetan Buddhism, and a high priest of the Bonpa sect that ruled supreme in Tibet and surrounding areas including Arunachal Pradesh in pre-Buddhist times.
Yangste is situated almost on the McMahon Line that divides Indian and Chinese-controlled territories and is considered the de facto border between the two Asian giants. The Indian Army built a post here only after 2014. Till then, it used to be a stopover on an arduous and rugged mule track.
China has a sound, even if familiar, strategy behind these skirmishes—one that yields dividends either way. It is a strategy with a four-pronged approach. First, had the Indian Army given up its positions on December 9, the PLA would have gleefully occupied the highest and dominant feature on the stretch. It would have given China significant military advantage thereon.
Second, the clash will result in the Indian Army setting up permanent deployment posts at Yangtse. The usual practice has been to leave these super-high altitude positions unmanned and unpatrolled during winter owing to the inclement weather. A winter deployment in these inhospitable areas would entail huge costs to the exchequer, besides posing additional challenges for soldiers, who would have to battle not only a hostile neighbour but also the rough weather and terrain.
Forward position: A file photo shows Indian Army personnel carrying out drills at Kibithu close to the LAC in Anjaw district of Arunachal Pradesh | PTI
Third, the initiation of the clash by the PLA may also be owing to its ongoing efforts to stretch the Indian Army too thin by forcing it to deploy men all along the Line of Actual Control and the McMahon Line. Ever since the border row sparked off in May-June 2020, followed closely by the Galwan valley clash of June 15, 2020, India and China have deployed and mobilised about one lakh soldiers and additional military equipment along the LAC. Apart from the strain on the public exchequer, it involves a huge logistical challenge for India. It is not so for China, as the terrain is much more hospitable on its side.
Fourth, the PLA might have tried to cock a snook at the growing bonhomie between the Indian Army and the US military. China was already upset over the Yudh Abhyas joint military exercise at Uttarakhand’s Auli, just 100km from the LAC, which was held from November 17 to December 2. This Chinese strategy stems from its belief that the US would not come to India’s help if and when tensions escalate along the LAC.
The Indian Army, however, has been cautious in its reaction to the incident. It played it down in a statement: “In certain areas along the LAC in Tawang sector in Arunachal Pradesh, there are areas of differing perception, wherein both sides patrol the area up to their claim lines. This has been the trend since 2006.”On ground though, reinforcements, including reserve troops airlifted from Guwahati, have already been mobilised.
The clash also became a hot topic during the winter session of Parliament. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh was more forthright in informing the Lok Sabha that PLA troops tried to transgress the LAC in Yangtse and unilaterally change the status quo. “The Chinese attempt was contested by our troops in a firm and resolute manner,” he said. “The Indian Army prevented the PLA from transgressing into our territory and compelled them to return to their posts.”
China, meanwhile, accused Indian troops of crossing the border illegally. “The Chinese troops made professional, normative and resolute response, bringing on-site situation under control,” said PLA’s Western Theatre Command spokesperson Senior Colonel Long Shaohua. “At present, the Chinese and Indian troops have disengaged.”Its foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said: “The China-India border areas are generally stable. The two sides have maintained smooth communication on boundary-related issues through diplomatic and military channels.”
The apparently tepid positions adopted by both India and China may be indicative of the reluctance on the two sides to escalate while keeping the border issue alive for strategic reasons. While it accords China with the opportunity to assert itself in south Asia, it allows India to balance its relations with the US and Russia with “strategic autonomy”as the main mantra. In other words, the optics of the incident becomes much more important than the incident itself.