Interview/ Captain Alok Bansal, director, India Foundation, and author, Gwadar: A Chinese Gibraltar
Captain Alok Bansal’s Gwadar: A Chinese Gibraltar is the result of 18 years of painstaking research. The Gwadar saga stretches back even further.
Pakistan had zeroed in on Gwadar to build a mega seaport in 1964, six years after acquiring it from Oman. The port would have the potential to accommodate super tankers and mother ships. And, that would be vital to attract the transit trade of central Asian nations. Moreover, it would allow Pakistan to keep an eye on the entire traffic to and from the crucial Persian Gulf.
But, work on the port began only in 2001. While the construction is almost complete, various associated projects are still in phases of development, including connectivity by road, rail and an airport. In 2013, the China Overseas Port Holding Company took over the leasing rights of the port and consequently Gwadar became a lynchpin in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Gwadar takes away the maritime advantage India enjoys over China in the Indian Ocean and embeds China in the northern Arabian Sea, thereby threatening India’s maritime security. Also, it adds to Chinese and Pakistani capability to threaten India’s energy security.
THE WEEK spoke to Captain Bansal on Gwadar. Edited excerpts:
Q Why do you call Gwadar a Chinese Gibraltar?
A Gibraltar controls access to the Mediterranean. This has been a British possession on the southern coast of Spain, another country. But Britain, by its presence in Gibraltar, controls any entry or exit from the Mediterranean towards the Atlantic. Similarly, and to some extent even more, because Gwadar is at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, China can control any traffic that is entering or exiting the Persian Gulf. Here we also need to understand that unlike the Mediterranean, which is open at both ends, the Persian Gulf can only be exited from one point―the Strait of Hormuz―and Gwadar is just outside the strait. So any maritime position there can monitor every vessel that is leaving or entering the Persian Gulf.
Q What did it take so long for Pakistan to try and develop it into a major port?
A Gwadar was not part of British India. Gwadar was with the Sultanate of Oman and it continued to be so till 1958. So, it took Pakistan some time to get Gwadar back. Secondly, this part of Pakistan, the Makran coast, is grossly underdeveloped. There is no water. It is a dry, parched land. More significantly, the Baloch never reconciled to being a part of Pakistan and there have been insurgencies off and on. It is only after various reports from international institutions which found Gwadar to be extremely suitable for a transshipment port that Pakistan decided to move.
But, Pakistan did not have the finances or resources required for a mega project like this; it is the biggest infrastructure project that Pakistan has ever undertaken. It was only the Chinese support that enabled Pakistan to build it.
Q Does the Chabahar Port reduce the strategic significance of Gwadar?
A Chabahar could be a competitor for Gwadar because Chabahar is equally well-located and could emerge as an ideal gateway for central Asian states. Being Iranian territory, it could also work as a gateway for the Transcaucasus region or Caucasian states like Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.
However, we need to understand that China is also connecting Chabahar; it is already connecting Iran with Belt and Road Initiative. So, Chinese goods are coming to Iran. In Chabahar itself, some berths have been offered to China.
From Pakistan's point of view, it is a big setback because Pakistan's primary objective is to enmesh China into its security dynamics. This is defeated if Chabahar becomes a commercially viable port. Then the shipping would go to Chabahar. So the economic development which Pakistan has planned and the viability of the CPEC to a great extent, will come under question.
Though both Chabahar and Gwadar are functioning ports, their operability is limited because of limitations of infrastructure and other issues. Gwadar has not yet become economically viable. The depths are not adequate, the infrastructure has really not come up and the hinterland has not developed. Consequently, any goods that are offloaded at Gwadar have to be taken over land to Karachi and then they head north. So that does not make them economically viable. Similarly, in Chabahar, there is a deficiency of cranes, though the road exists, but the ideal connectivity would be when train tracks come to Chabahar and connect them with the Iranian national grid. More importantly, Iran continues to be under sanctions. So these are issues which we will have to look into.
Q To what extent would Gwadar threaten India's energy security?
A It threatens India's energy security to a great extent. A major chunk of India's refining capacity is in the Gulf of Kutch. The sea line of communication, from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Kutch, passes just 40 nautical miles from Gwadar. That means any small boat in Gwadar can interdict a ship which is coming from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Kutch.
As far as India's energy security is concerned, a very large chunk is dependent on the single point mooring located in Gulf of Kutch. The ships bringing crude to the single point mooring pass close to Gwadar.
Q Why do you say that China being guided only by economic considerations is a hollow proposition when it comes to developing Gwadar?
A One of the proposals which the Chinese have projected is that they are developing Gwadar because this provides them energy security; crude can be offloaded here and taken along the CPEC to western China.
China has been trying to project that its role is purely economic, but the actions on ground do not reflect that. The way China has built a new international airport with hardly any traffic.... But, more importantly, Pakistanis have been projecting that there is a security angle to it. They have kept vast land for development of naval base and they are hoping that China gets involved in it.
China has started taking overseas bases. They have already set up an overseas base in Djibouti. And we have seen in the past that China initially denies any such events and when it happens, then they present it as a fait accompli to the world.
So, there is definitely a security dimension. Pure economics does not justify a huge investment like this.