Alexei Navalny, probably the most famous critic of the Kremlin, died on February 16, in a high-security penal colony nicknamed ‘Polar Wolf’, located in the Yamalo-Nenets region, north of the Arctic Circle. Navalny was serving a 19-year sentence on charges of extremism since August 2023. Before his final incarceration, he had to face several other legal cases, sentences, home arrests and an episode of alleged poisoning in 2020.
Navalny led the Anti-Corruption Foundation, which he set up in 2011. The group was known for its videos on social media on the alleged riches of Russia’s top officials and billionaires. Russia designated it as an extremist organisation in 2021 and it was liquidated by the Moscow City Court. In 2022, when Navalny was already in jail, he announced the relaunch of the foundation, now international, with a funding of €50,000 that he got from the Sakharov Prize awarded by the European parliament.
While Navalny was popular across the world, it was different in his home country. His personality and views, his entire political career―something that skips the eye of outsiders―turned many people off in Russia. As a Russian journalist noted, “He was certainly far more popular and loved abroad than in Russia.”
Navalny was born in 1976 in the Moscow region to an army officer hailing from Ukraine―a village near Chernobyl―and a lab technician. He got his law degree from the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia in Moscow, and in 2001, he got a degree in finance from the Finance Academy under the Russian government.
Navalny entered politics in 2000 with the then vibrant, liberal Yabloko party. While at Yabloko, he met several activists who would later become prominent faces of Russian opposition, such as Ilya Yashin and Nikita Belykh. A year later, he was elected to the council of the Moscow branch of the party.
In 2007, Navalny founded the national-democratic movement called Narod, along with writer and former member of the National Bolshevik Party, Zakhar Prilepin (who was severely injured last year in an assassination attempt that Moscow has blamed on the United States and Ukraine), and former member of the Saint Petersburg legislative assembly, Sergey Gulyaev. One of the sponsors of the movement was Stanislav Belkovsky, once a mid-level Kremlin adviser and now a popular commentator for western media outlets, living in Israel. Navalny was soon expelled from Yabloko “for causing political damage to the party, in particular for nationalist activities”.
During this time, two notorious videos of Navalny campaigning for gun rights to fight Muslim migrants from former Soviet republics―he compared them to “cockroaches”―and advocating for deportation of “non-Russians” appeared. Narod’s activities soon came to a stop, but Navalny’s graph continued to rise. He chose an indirect political route by purchasing shares in state-owned companies and subsequently leveraging his shareholder status to raise concerns about mismanagement and corruption. Speaking to the Kommersant-Dengi magazine in 2009, Navalny explained his interest in politics: “Old opposition leaders are so irrelevant that a smart, young person will be noticed right away.”
Navalny’s career took a sharp turn in 2010. Upon the recommendation of three people who are some of the most prominent critics of the Kremlin (and are based outside Russia)―economist Sergei Guriev, journalist Yevgenia Albats and chess grandmaster-turned political activist Garry Kasparov―Navalny joined a six-month course at Yale University under the Yale World Fellows programme. “Alexei was a Yale World Fellow from the class of 2010, who embodied the ideals of the open society and dedicated his life to the pursuit of a better Russia,” wrote Emma Sky, director of the International Leadership Centre, Yale University, after Navalny’s death.
Navalny returned to Russia after the course. Months later, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in what the western media labelled as the “biggest protests of the Putin era”. The Bolotnaya protests, which denounced what demonstrators deemed as a flawed electoral process, represented a crucial juncture for both Russia’s opposition movement and the government’s stance towards street demonstrations. These protests would shape the trajectory of Russian politics for the following decade. That was also when Navalny began to gain attention from western leaders and media. To be sure, that was also the time when he would be noticed by Russians – polls showed awareness about Navalny increased from 6 per cent in April 2011 to 48 per cent in September 2014.
The timing of Navalny’s alleged killing―for which Russia and the west blame each other―appears suspicious. It came hours before Ukraine announced its withdrawal from the strategic eastern city of Avdiivka after several months of fighting. It also coincided with a US congressional vote on a $60 billion military package to Ukraine and with the Munich Security Conference where world leaders discussed Russia’s threat to the world, while keeping Moscow out. Navalny’s wife, Yulia Navalnaya, was in Munich, and she was swiftly given the stage to deliver a speech condemning Russian President Vladimir Putin. Two days later, she said she would continue her husband’s work and called on his supporters in Russia to join her in fighting Putin. She also said that their team knew why Navalny was killed by Putin, how it was executed, and that they would reveal the details.
The news of Navalny’s death came just a few days after American political commentator Tucker Carlson published his interview with Putin, making the Kremlin’s point of view accessible to western audiences. While Navalny’s death and the west’s reaction to it remained top news, many other important things were largely ignored by the world media, such as the trial of whistleblower journalist Julian Assange which began in London on February 20. Ahead of the hearing, Assange’s wife, Stella, said her husband would die if he was extradited to the US. The death of US-Chilean journalist, Gonzalo Lira, which took place in January, too, did not find much mention in the west. Lira died in an Ukrainian prison where he was kept after trying to flee to Europe.
Political analysts in Russia believe that Navalny’s passing, which came just a month before the elections in March, would not shift the political landscape in Russia or tarnish Putin’s reputation. This assertion is grounded in the perceived limited relevance of Navalny or any other liberal opposition figure in contemporary Russia.
Hours after Navalny’s death, a video surfaced online. It was first released by Russian security services in 2021. In the clip, allegedly taken in 2012, a person who looks like Navalny’s right-hand man Vladimir Ashurkov can be seen talking to a British intelligence officer. “If we had more money, we could expand our opportunities, of course. If somebody would spend a little money… $10 million-$20 million a year on supporting this, we would see a different picture,” he can be heard saying.
We may perhaps never know what happened in ‘Polar Wolf’, or who actually backed Navalny, but what he embodied was an image of the ‘ideal’ opposition leader―young, handsome, bold and supported by a loving wife and children. For some people, it was undeniably an attractive image.
But in reality, the complexities of Russia, its geographic, economic and geopolitical realities, require not just an image, but also a vision, a programme and skills, and also support from the established political system. Russia is not a marginal regional player where candidates can be placed, tried, and replaced at will. It is a nuclear power able to influence the global military, economic and strategic balance, even though the west still prefers to deny it.
While in jail, Navalny used to communicate with his supporters through social media posts delivered through his lawyers. His irony-filled posts on his life in prison encouraged people to not give up on making Russia a better place―a message relevant to many, irrespective of their political preferences. However, neither Navalny, nor the collective opposition, articulated the vision for Russia based on today’s realities that are different from those of 2021 and particularly those of 2011.
Navalny’s brand will remain alive long after his demise, but the alternative acceptable to Russia of 2024 and beyond has to emerge from within.
Ksenia Kondratieva, a journalist based in Saint Petersburg, works as India editor at rt.com.