IN DIPLOMACY, timing is key. India’s moment could be here and now.
Back in Delhi from his trip to Ukraine on August 23, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had two important telephone conversations. On August 26, he spoke with US President Joe Biden, and the next day, it was Russian President Vladimir Putin who was on the other end of the phone. In both exchanges, the key topic would have been Ukraine.
India shares a ‘Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership’ with Russia and a ‘Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership’ with the US. Modi was in Moscow in July for the 22nd India-Russia annual summit. While India-Russia ties have a long history, relationship with the US has been a chequered one, although it has been considerably warm in recent years, particularly after China’s dramatic rise as a global power. Just a day before Modi made his trip to Kyiv, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh landed in the US for a four-day visit.
In the joint statement after his Ukraine visit, Modi “reiterated India’s willingness to contribute in all possible ways to facilitate an early return of peace”. So is India leveraging its ties with Russia and the west to position itself as a mediator?
D.B. Venkatesh Varma, former Indian ambassador to Russia, said India’s capability to broker peace in Ukraine was quite low because of the nature of the conflict. “It is not amenable to mediation at this point of time. Both sides believe they can win. So why will they compromise? Military exhaustion has to set in, and that has not yet happened.”
Experts, however, believe that Modi’s visit to Kyiv was keenly watched globally and that it enhanced India’s prestige. “One-to-one meetings with both Putin and Zelensky within a month and a half underline India’s acceptability to both warring sides,” said former diplomat R. Dayakar. “But the road ahead is not an easy one as there is no meeting ground between Russia and Ukraine. So there is perhaps more than meets the eye in Modi’s meeting. We will have to let things unfold.”
The Ukraine visit has thrown open the question whether India has effected a subtle shift in its strategic posture by aligning more closely with the west. Historically, India has been known for its pro-Russia stance on global issues. For instance, although India attended the Ukraine peace summit in Switzerland on June 15 and 16, it refrained from signing the joint communique as the Russian point of view was missing. Russia was not invited to the summit.
Modi visited Moscow on July 8, the same day that a Russian missile devastated a children’s hospital in Kyiv. And it took place just a day before the US hosted leaders of the 32 NATO countries and the leaders of the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea to discuss the Ukraine crisis. It, however, did not stop Modi from embracing Putin warmly, giving the beleaguered Russian leader a major public relations victory. But India took note of the fact that it was kept out of the Ukraine conclave held in Washington, DC.
The US also expressed disappointment about Modi’s Moscow visit, but India said it was only expressing its freedom of choice. “In a multipolar world, all countries have a freedom of choice. It is essential for everybody to be mindful of and appreciate such realities,” said Randhir Jaiswal, spokesperson for the ministry of external affairs. By invoking its “freedom of choice” and “strategic autonomy”, India has been trying hard to maintain cordial ties with Russia and to ensure that the western opprobrium did not push Moscow further into the Chinese orbit.
Said Varma, “The Ukraine situation is in a flux, so we have to be engaged with both sides. It is good that the prime minister is engaging with both sides, despite Ukraine being a complicated issue. It is a courageous step in Indian diplomacy. And one must remember that not all diplomatic efforts give instantaneous results.”
The Indian position on the conflict in Ukraine has several aspects. India believes that its ties with Russia and Ukraine are not ‘zero-sum games’ and wants to chart a substantive and independent path with both countries. Second, India still believes that diplomacy and dialogue can resolve the conflict and can lead to enduring peace. Third, as Modi has made clear, a lasting solution to the conflict cannot be found on the battlefield.
However, with no end to the Ukraine crisis in sight, India could be trying to balance its ties with Russia and the west and it could seriously challenge Indian diplomacy. As the US defence establishment gets closer to India, more questions will be asked about its ties with Russia. The Rajnath visit to the US has yielded a key pact, the Security of Supplies Arrangement (SOSA), which encourages the defence industrial ecosystems of both countries to work together. It also enhances supply chain resilience. It follows a slew of foundational agreements already in place between the two nations that seek to integrate military services, assets and technologies. These include the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (2016), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (2018) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (2020).
At the same time, India has benefited immensely by buying discounted Russian oil since the Ukraine conflict started in February 2022. Moscow now accounts for 42 per cent of India’s total crude oil imports, compared with just 2 per cent before the start of the conflict.
On the military front, too, dependence on Russia cannot be overlooked as 65 per cent of the Indian arsenal is of Russian origin. Yet, India has been moving away from Russia on defence supplies by roping in more sources like the US, France and Israel and also by adhering to the ‘Atmanirbharta’ (self-reliance) policy. Interestingly, no new weapon deals were inked during Modi’s Moscow visit, quite a rarity in bilateral ties. But Modi did reiterate the all-weather nature of India-Russia ties: “The temperature sometimes falls below zero in Russia but the temperature is always above zero in India-Russia relations,” he said. “Russia remains India’s trusted friend in any weather.”