D.B. Venkatesh Varma
As India marks the 50th anniversary of Pokhran I, we remember that India’s journey towards becoming a nuclear power in a hierarchical world has not been an easy one. Finding a place worthy of respect in the nuclear order meant finding the right balance between power and principle and finding the optimal alignment between the three dimensions of state power―political, technological and diplomatic.
The dawn of the nuclear age preceded independent India’s ability to shape its contours. India’s calls for nuclear disarmament, cessation of nuclear testing and the arms race―articulated strongly by prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru since the early 1950s―barely had an impact on the efforts of the nuclear powers to shape the nuclear order in their own image. When the draft of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was finalised in 1967, India’s interests were largely ignored. Even though India had acquired by then the ability to reprocess plutonium, the lack of other technological requirements to make a bomb and the fact that the country had not tested a nuclear device weakened its campaign to have its interests protected in the treaty.
Fortunately, prime minister Indira Gandhi took the decision not to sign the NPT. The first Pokhran nuclear test on May 18, 1974, was a major milestone. Indira Gandhi deserves credit for taking the plunge, which previous prime ministers had avoided. The successful test demonstrated that technologically India’s nuclear capabilities had matured, backed by a political decision that overcame numerous organisational, ideological and moral considerations that had held India back.
If the expectation was that the first Pokhran test had finally resolved the political and technological challenges for India to emerge as a full-fledged nuclear power, it turned out to be wrong. The United States led the other nuclear powers in establishing the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1977, which steadily tightened the nuclear noose around India. The global space for India’s diplomacy was further restricted by geopolitics―the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put Pakistan squarely in the US camp, which turned a blind eye to its clandestine nuclear proliferation programme. China extended substantial aid for Pakistan’s nuclear weapon and missile programmes.
The end of the Cold War made the diplomatic situation even more precarious for India. In 1992, the NSG imposed full scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear supplies. The indefinite extension of the NPT put the final nail in the coffin of Indian expectations that there would be progress on nuclear disarmament, which had earlier been articulated in the 1988 Action Plan on Disarmament of prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. The conclusion of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and the prospects of an early treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons threatened to put India in a very tight corner. Under prime minister P.V. Narasimha Rao’s leadership, India was able to play a weak diplomatic hand brilliantly.
The Pokhran II tests in 1998 under prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, could not have come a moment too soon for India to breakout of a possibly permanent nuclear encirclement. Technologically, the tests proved India’s advanced capabilities, including in thermonuclear weapons. Politically, India finally rid itself of ideological hesitations to declare itself openly as a nuclear power. However, the international reaction from the US and its allies posed a new diplomatic challenge.
The diplomatic engagement with the international order went through various phases―the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks and later the NSSP (Next Steps in Strategic Partnership) with the US. With demonstrated Indian nuclear capabilities, its firm resolve despite international opposition to pursue a credible minimum nuclear deterrent programme, its readiness to engage internationally and changing geopolitics finally compelled the US to change its policy on India’s nuclear programme from roll-back to some form of accommodation.
The process that took this forward was the Civil Nuclear Initiative (2004-2008) under the leadership of prime minister Manmohan Singh. Given the complexity of the issues involved, this was one of the most significant diplomatic exercises undertaken by independent India and perhaps also one of the most successful.
The end result was that India protected its strategic programme and its ability to move ahead on the nuclear weapons programme despite not signing the NPT. It also removed the albatross hanging around the neck of India’s bilateral ties with the US, facilitating its rapid expansion. The chains of India’s nuclear bondage were finally broken. Indian diplomacy was put to its most severe test, and it came out with flying colours. This was India’s finest diplomatic hour.
In the past decade, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s nuclear doctrine has been further strengthened through a triad and ASAT (anti-satellite weapon) capabilities. Today, India is seen as a responsible nuclear power with nuclear cooperation agreements with over a dozen countries. Our civil nuclear programme is posed for a major boost in power production in the coming decade.
This journey, over the past five decades, has been hard and daunting. But we succeeded because of the persistence of successive prime ministers, the diligent efforts of generations of our nuclear scientists, the talent of our diplomats and the faith of our people that India should never accept a place of subordination in the global order. As we celebrate Pokhran I, there are lessons that we must remember. In the global arena, more often than not, a country’s place in the hierarchical order is not given, but taken. India’s principles will be taken seriously only when it is backed by adequate power.
Varma was ambassador to Russia, Spain and the Conference on Disarmament. He was part of India’s negotiating team for the Civil Nuclear Initiative.