Shyam Saran
GREAT POWER AMBITIONS
IT IS A FORTUITOUS coincidence that the NITI Aayog has just released its approach paper on a “Vision for Viksit Bharat@2047”, the year marking the 100th anniversary of India’s independence. In exploring what India’s international role and status would be in that year, one may note certain key assumptions and projections contained in the paper.
The “Vision” sets the goal of our national endeavours at becoming a developed nation, for which “we need to strive to be a $30 trillion economy by 2047 with a per capita income of $18,000 (Rs15 lakh) per annum. The GDP would have to grow nine times from today’s $3.36 trillion and the per capita income would need to rise eight times from today’s $2,392 (Rs2 lakh) per annum.”
The paper declares: “In a Viksit Bharat, the economy will be a leading global economy, a driver of global economic growth, a magnet of global talent, trade and capital. Its cities and markets will be among the largest and top-most business and financial centres of the world.” Further, there will be “Indian-origin Global Business Champions in manufacturing, services, agriculture, R&D and innovation, technology and scale.”
These projections would make India the third largest economy in 2047 behind China and the US, but what would be the gap with these two powers? It is the relative equation which matters. The Indian economy may end up half as large as China’s, and two-thirds of the US. Projected to grow faster than both China and the US, India would have shrunk the gap with both countries and this will bestow greater agency on it in the shaping and management of the international order by mid-century.
For geopolitical heft, the size of the GDP matters, but what may matter even more is how globally engaged the economy is, for example, in terms of the volume of foreign trade as a percentage of global trade and, likewise, in terms of the volume of inward and external investment flows. Over the past few years, India’s foreign trade as a percentage of global trade has been falling after a period of steady increase. It is now less than 2 per cent. As the world’s fifth largest economy, India ought to be its fifth largest trading nation. It is the ninth. Its ambition should be to match its third ranking status in global GDP by becoming at least the third largest trading nation by 2047. China is the largest trading nation in the world, constituting 15 per cent of all trade flows. It is likely to retain this rank well into mid-century. It is the largest trade partner for virtually all east Asian and southeast Asian countries. It is the leading economy in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and has applied to become part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), both large, Asia focused regional trade and investment arrangements. India walked out of the RCEP and shows no signs of exploring the CPTPP membership. Without a strong economic pillar to buttress its political and security profile, India is unlikely to leverage its large GDP in 2047 to achieve greater influence in its own extended neighbourhood.
The next two decades must see the formulation and execution of a strategy which denies China its ambition to be the dominant power in Asia. India is the only country which has the potential to match China in terms of area, population, economic potential and scale, military and force projection capabilities and significant scientific and technological capabilities. Most countries in Asia and beyond recognise this and hope that India will step up to the plate. But India is seen as a reluctant partner.
India cannot aspire to a larger regional role in Asia, much less the world, unless it gets its own periphery right. It must take the lead in regional economic integration of South Asia. Before becoming “a driver of global economic growth”, it should become the engine of growth for all its south Asian neighbours, including Pakistan. The self-confidence that it displays in pursuing its global ambitions must first be directed towards knitting its neighbours together in a dense web of interdependencies. Here the very asymmetry of all round power that India enjoys vis-à-vis all its neighbours in the subcontinent is an asset. If India were to open its markets to all its neighbours, allowing access to its large and expanding market to whatever they produce and sell, this would be a tiny fraction of the total volume of India’s trade. If India were to become the transit country of choice for its neighbours to trade among themselves or with the outside world there would hardly be any load on India’s rapidly expanding transport network. India could also encourage two-way investment in the region, creating mutual stakes in each other’s prosperity.
South Asia is also a single ecological space, sharing mountains, forests, rivers and the seas. An effective response to the twin challenges of climate change and ecological degradation is possible only through collaborative efforts of all the south Asian countries.
India can indeed become a “magnet for global talent, trade and capital”, but this requires more liberal visa policies, less restrictive employment conditions for foreign talent and opening up the country to a flourishing exchange of scholars, students and civil society communities. Security imperatives act as a dampener on such mutually beneficial international exchanges. India’s ambition to emerge as an intellectual hub is not compatible with security-driven barriers on such exchanges.
The approach paper sets the goal for India to be “an inclusive and democratic development role model”. India’s influence will be not determined only by the raw sinews of its power, but more effectively by the power of its example. India has been admired across the world as a successful example of a multiethnic, multireligious, multilingual and multicultural plural democracy. It is a vibrant and living example of democracy being not only compatible with development but, in a real sense, ensuring that development stays focused on the empowerment of the people rather than the state which must remain accountable to them.
The goal of India’s external engagement must be to create and sustain an external environment conducive to enhancing the welfare of the people. India needs a much larger corps of skilled negotiators, combining domain knowledge with diplomatic acumen. Major events such as the 2023 G20 summit are important. They showcase India’s accomplishments and manifest the country’s enhanced international profile and status. Their outcomes create opportunities for India to advance its interests in several fields. However, opportunities can translate into substantive benefits only in the negotiating processes which follow away from the public glare. India needs to be fully represented in these negotiating forums to uphold the country’s interests. There are simply not enough trained and experienced negotiators to represent India at such fora. For shaping the future global political and economic landscape, this human resource constraint must be addressed urgently.
We are living in a world where the salience of cross-national and truly global challenges is increasing relentlessly. Whether it is climate change or public health challenges such as pandemics, nuclear proliferation or cyber security, regulation of space-based assets or artificial intelligence, they all demand global and collaborative responses delivered through multilateral processes and empowered international governance institutions. Without a sense of common humanity and international solidarity, multilateralism will not work. This is where India could play the role of “a catalyst for dialogue and peace”, which the NITI Aayog paper refers to, by drawing upon its unmatched record of multilateral activism and contribution to peace-keeping. Representing the concerns and interests of the Global South would add heft to India’s global role. It is important to seek permanent membership of the UN Security Council, despite the odds, because this remains the marker of great power status.
Indian democracy has demonstrated its success in managing immense diversity. The people of India are innately cosmopolitan and comfortable as global citizens. These attributes may be more consequential in charting its trajectory to great power status in 2047.
Shyam Saran, former foreign secretary